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I. Introduction
1 When confronted with the question of whether to admit 
similar fact for criminal cases, courts in Singapore are often 
faced with balancing potentially competing norms in the form 
of evidential expediency and fairness to the accused. Specifically, 
although similar fact may help establish the ingredients of an 
offence, there exists a real risk that any resulting conviction 
will be based heavily on the past behaviour or disposition of the 
accused and this potential weakness in inferential reasoning 
through indirect proof will – to use the word in its broadest 
sense – prejudice the accused.1
2 The 1996 Court of Appeal decision in Tan Meng Jee v Public 
Prosecutor2 (“Tan Meng Jee”) tried to address these concerns in 
detail. But even after almost 25 years, this case remains the only 
modern apex court decision on how the similar fact rule is to be 
1 Taking a step back, one must bear in mind too features of the Singapore 
criminal justice process. As a matter of criminal procedure, the Criminal 
Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) is generally considered to tilt more in 
favour of crime control. As a matter of substantive criminal law, potentially 
severe sanctions could follow upon conviction. As a matter of standard of 
proof, a strict insistence on corroboration is generally not required, and any 
proving of a defence must be done on a balance of probabilities, which is 
a higher standard than casting reasonable doubt.
2 [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178.
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treated and applied. This is so despite recent shifts in the evidence 
law landscape which has sown considerable uncertainty over how 
the similar fact rule should be applied in Singapore. For instance, 
amendments have been made to the relevancy provisions of the 
Evidence Act,3 and the law on whether there exists a judicial 
discretion or even inherent power to exclude relevant evidence 
has also undergone various changes jurisprudentially.
3 The key aim of this article is thus to apprise both 
prosecutors and defence counsel of how the similar fact rule 
in Singapore would operate today in criminal proceedings by 
essentially providing a checklist of considerations. In so doing, 
it will also set out the background to the rule and the basic (but 
peculiar) features of the Evidence Act, so that the rule can be 
properly understood in the context it operates in.
II. Understanding the similar fact rule in Singapore
A. Definition
4 What exactly constitutes similar fact, and when is it 
meant to be used? In the criminal law context,4 the similar 
fact rule is an exclusionary rule of evidence that “limits the 
admissibility of evidence that goes not towards proving directly 
that an accused has committed the crime he has been charged 
with but towards his past conduct, and that may form a basis for 
inferring that the accused has committed the said crime”.5 In Tan 
Meng Jee for instance, evidence relating to the accused’s other 
drug trafficking activities (that were not part of the charge) was 
found to be inadmissible to support a finding of his mental state 
when he engaged in the physical act of transporting drugs.6 The 
Court of Appeal opined that the accused’s history of trafficking 
drugs to his friends did not mean he was going to traffic drugs 
3 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed.
4 Although the similar fact rule applies in the civil context (see for instance 
Rockline Ltd v Anil Thadani [2009] SGHC 209), this article will focus on its 
application in the criminal context.
5 Chen Siyuan, “Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in Singapore” (2011) Sing 
JLS 553 at 553.
6 Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [56].
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to the specific individual in question.7 On an epistemic level, the 
evidence was simply not compelling enough.
B. Features of the Evidence Act
5 Before exploring the similar fact rule in greater detail, 
one must grapple with the Evidence Act’s unique paradigm for 
establishing relevance and admitting evidence. The starting 
point for any given question of evidence law in Singapore must 
be the Evidence Act. As will be explained, the common law rules 
of evidence can potentially be trumped by what is stated in the 
Evidence Act if they are inconsistent with the statute.
(1) Inclusionary, and not exclusionary, approach
6 Under the Evidence Act, the touchstones for admissibility 
are relevancy and reliability.8 Relevance is established by the 
relevancy provisions of the Evidence Act that provide the criteria 
for admissibility (ss 6 to 57), while reliability can be considered as 
the overarching principle of these provisions. Unlike the common 
law approach, the Evidence Act does not distinguish between 
relevance and admissibility. Section 5 sets the tone by allowing 
only the admission of evidence of facts in issue (elements of 
an offence or defence), and other facts deemed relevant under 
the Evidence Act (or less direct, more circumstantial means of 
proving the facts in issue).9 Strictly speaking, any given piece 
7 Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [56].
8 Chen Siyuan, “The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence: 
Perspectives from an Indian Evidence Act Jurisdiction” (2012) 16(4) Intl J 
Evidence & Proof 398 at 416–420; Chen Siyuan & Nicholas Poon, “Reliability 
and Relevance as the Touchstones for Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings” (2012) 24(2) SAcLJ 535 at 545–551. To be clear, there are certain 
provisions, such as s 23, which pertain to settlement negotiations, and those 
which pertain to good character, that reflect less of an indicator of logical 
relevance but more of a policy position – the facilitation of uninhibited 
discussions of liability for s 23, and the freedom to litigate for the good 
character provisions.
9 See too s 138(1) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (notwithstanding 
that it is not a relevancy provision): “When either party proposes to give 
evidence of any fact, the court may ask the party proposing to give the 
evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant; and 
the court shall admit the evidence if it thinks that the fact, if proved, would 
be relevant, and not otherwise.”
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of evidence must pass muster under the Evidence Act, but in 
practice, this is only enforced for clearly problematic pieces of 
evidence or evidence which is strenuously objected to. There is 
generally a judicial preference for as much evidence as possible 
to be admitted, so that the fact-finder can better piece together 
the factual matrix.
7 Secondly, relevance is established in the form of so‑called 
inclusionary, rather than exclusionary, rules.10 The original 
drafter of the Evidence Act, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, had 
deliberately adopted this unique approach as he considered 
the long‑standing common law approach of jumping through 
multiple hoops to determine admissibility – what is logically 
relevant, what is legally excluded, what is legally excepted, and 
what may nonetheless be left out as a matter of discretion – 
to be confusing and cumbersome for the fact-finder. Ambitious 
as he was to attempt defining logical relevance exhaustively, 
this peculiar aspect of the Evidence Act has remained with 
us after 150 years. Crucially, there was no indication that the 
relevancy provisions of the Evidence Act were ever designed with 
non‑epistemic criteria in mind.
(2) Protective mechanisms of weight and discretion
8 As a protective mechanism against over‑admitting 
evidence, the courts may, at an appropriate stage of the 
proceedings, attach less or no weight to admitted evidence.11 
Singapore has long abolished the jury system – arguably for 
whom the rules of admissibility of evidence were originally 
designed – and judges are trained to assess evidence objectively 
10 Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law Reform 
Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at para 30.
11 Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 February 2012), vol 88 at 1140 
(K Shanmugam, Minister for Law); ss 32 and 147 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 
1997 Rev Ed). On this note, one should not lightly conflate evidence that is 
given no weight and evidence that has been “excluded”. There are at least 
three differences: first, evidence that is not even admitted is not part of the 
factual record, and this has implications on appeal; second, evidence that 
is not admitted on the basis of a legal rule as opposed to a discretion may, 
also on appeal, be treated differently; and finally, matters of discretion are 
generally less amenable to particularised reasoning in judgments.
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and sift wheat from the chaff.12 On the part of counsel, there 
is also the expectation evidence with questionable relevance or 
reliability should not be adduced.13
9 Another protective mechanism is the court’s discretion to 
consider as inadmissible evidence that has been found relevant. 
While there may be a widely held view by lawyers that such 
a discretion exists and has always existed,14 Singapore’s case law 
actually remains rather divided on this – for instance, whether 
the discretion is residual or mandatory, when it is to be applied, 
whether it is justified on inherent powers or otherwise, and what 
is to be balanced when exercising the discretion.15 In the context 
of similar fact, the answer is even less obvious due to the paucity 
of specific case law. The only thing that is clear is that following 
the 2012 amendments to the Evidence Act, evidence may be found 
inadmissible if it is “in the interests of justice” to do so under 
ss 32(3) and 47(4). The problem is that these provisions only 
pertain to a particular class of hearsay evidence and a particular 
class of opinion evidence.
(3) General relevancy provisions vis-à-vis specific 
relevancy provisions
10 Further, though not reflected explicitly in the statute, 
the Evidence Act’s relevancy provisions were split by Stephen 
into two categories: general relevancy provisions (ss 6 to 11) 
and specific relevancy provisions (ss 12 to 57). While specific 
relevancy provisions were meant to codify exceptions to common 
law exclusionary rules as they stood in the 1800s, the purpose 
and usage of general relevancy provisions are unclear, and 
12 Chan Sek Keong, “The Criminal Process – The Singapore Model” (1996) 
17 Sing L Rev 433 at 456.
13 See generally Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 February 2012), vol 88.
14 See generally Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 February 2012), vol 88.
15 See Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239; Lee 
Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447; Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan 
bin Adnan [2011] SGHC 107; Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 
3 SLR 1205; Wan Lai Ting v Kea Kah Kim [2014] 4 SLR 795; ANB v ANC [2015] 
5 SLR 522.
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their ambit of admissibility is also far wider than the specific 
relevancy provisions.16
11 There is no judicial pronouncement yet as to whether 
both general and specific relevancy provisions must be satisfied 
before evidence can be admitted, but the weight of case law points 
towards a less strict approach – as long as a relevancy provision is 
satisfied, that is enough.17 This may have consequences, however, 
as to whether the evidence can be subject to a discretion to render 
relevant evidence inadmissible, and whether the evidence may 
be given less weight since the relevancy criteria in the specific 
relevancy provisions are clearly more stringent.
(4) Relationship between the Evidence Act and common law
12 Lastly, as alluded to earlier, the High Court in Law Society 
of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis (“Phyllis Tan”) has interpreted 
s 2(2) of the Evidence Act as allowing common law rules 
of evidence to be applied only if they are consistent with the 
provisions of the Evidence Act; one such rule would be the court 
having the discretion to exclude relevant evidence.18 This primacy 
accorded to the Evidence Act can be contrasted with the approach 
taken in cases such as Public Prosecutor v Teo Ai Nee (“Teo Ai Nee”), 
which declined to follow the Evidence Act at all and ruled that 
the court had inherent power to exclude (similar fact) evidence 
even if it was relevant under the Evidence Act.19 To the extent 
that the cases that clearly disregarded the relevancy provisions 
of the Evidence Act are older than the ones that do not, the safer 
assumption is that the Evidence Act must still be adhered to.
16 Chen Siyuan, “The Future of the Similar Fact Rule in an Indian Evidence Act 
Jurisdiction: Singapore” (2013) 6 NUJS L Rev 361 at 366.
17 See Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh [2017] 3 SLR 66; Micheal 
Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 748.
18 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 
at [124]–[126].
19 Public Prosecutor v Teo Ai Nee [1995] 1 SLR(R) 450 at [76]–[79].
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III. Framework for admitting similar fact
A. Proving mens rea
13 When Stephen drafted the Evidence Act, he had envisioned 
that similar fact could only be adduced via s 14 or s 15 to prove 
the mens rea of an offence. Section 14 states:
Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such as 
intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will 
or good‑will towards any particular person, or showing the 
existence of any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant 
when the existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily 
feeling is in issue or relevant.
14 Although the provision does not explicitly refer to similar 
fact, Explanation 1 requires evidence to show the existence of 
a relevant state of mind in reference to “the particular matter 
in question”. This is made clearer in illustration (o), where 
an accused person is tried for murdering a person by shooting 
him. The fact that he had previously shot the same person is 
admissible similar fact, but the fact that he had previously shot 
other people, even with the intent to murder, is not.20 One may 
also be guided by Ler Wee Teang Anthony v Public Prosecutor, where 
the accused’s numerous utterances about getting someone to 
kill his wife evinced his ill will towards her.21 This evidence was 
admitted because of its relevance to the offence of instigating 
a murder.22 There is therefore no doubt that a high degree of 
specificity of state of mind is required under s 14. A general 
disposition to commit crime will not satisfy the high threshold.
15 As for s 15 of the Evidence Act, it states:
When there is a question whether an act was accidental or 
intentional or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the 
20 See also illustration (p):
A is tried for a crime.
The fact that he said something indicating an intention to commit that 
particular crime is relevant.
The fact that he said something indicating a general disposition to 
commit crimes of that class is irrelevant.
21 [2002] 1 SLR(R) 770 at [59].
22 Ler Wee Teang Anthony v Public Prosecutor [2002] 1 SLR(R) 770 at [59].
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fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, 
in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, 
is relevant.
16 Like s 14, s 15 only addresses questions about state of 
mind, though its reference to similar fact is more direct, as 
evinced in the requirement for “a series of similar occurrences”. 
This threshold is also a high one, as reflected for instance in 
illustration (a), in which a person is accused of burning down 
his house to obtain money for which it is insured. The fact that 
he had lived in several houses successively, each of which he had 
insured, in each of which a fire had occurred, and after each of 
these fires he had received payment from a different insurance 
office, could be relevant as tending to show that the fire was 
not accidental.
17 There is no requirement for ss 14 and 15 to be read and 
used together, as the provisions cater to different ways for similar 
fact to be used. But doubts linger as to how they are to be applied 
when the common law rules come into the picture. On the one 
hand, the traditional common law categorisation approach in 
Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales23 (“Makin”) – similar 
fact may not be admitted merely to show general propensity, but 
may be admitted to rebut a claim of lack of mens rea or any other 
defence open to the accused – is broadly compatible with ss 14 and 
15. Section 2(2) of the Evidence Act is probably not contravened, 
and indeed, Singapore courts still continue to cite Makin.24
18 On the other hand, the more modern, albeit statutorily 
displaced test of balancing probative value and prejudicial 
effect as set out in Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman25 
(“Boardman”) is probably not compatible with the Evidence Act. 
23 [1894] AC 57.
24 See for instance Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 748; 
Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Menjeet Singh [2017] 3 SLR 66. At minimum, 
the aspect about propensity evidence is compatible with the Evidence Act 
(Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), but the aspect about using similar fact to rebut any 
given defence is not. If an accused person simply denies the charge, similar 
fact cannot be admitted via s 14 or s 15, but may be via Makin v Attorney-
General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57.
25 [1975] AC 421. In the UK, similar fact is now governed by ss 98–113 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c 44).
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The Court of Appeal in Tan Meng Jee recognised this, but went 
ahead to superimpose the balancing test onto ss 14 and 15.26 
The court claimed that this was “warranted both in principle as 
well as on the wording of the legislation itself”: the aforesaid 
illustration (o) to s 14 demonstrates how the balance should 
be struck, and “similar” in s 15 hints at the probative value 
of evidence.27 Additionally, the court suggested applying three 
factors to ascertain probative value: cogency, relevance and 
strength of inference.28 It did not elaborate on what prejudice 
meant, suggesting that it had a more limited, epistemic definition 
of lack of probative value.
19 The reason why Boardman is incompatible with the 
Evidence Act is that its gateway for admitting similar fact is much 
wider than ss 14 and 15. Under Boardman, propensity evidence can 
be admitted if it is probative enough – there is no requirement 
that the state of mind must be specific or any similarity must be 
striking.29 A series of similar occurrences is also not required, 
and similar fact used to prove actus reus is not barred.
20 Yet another reason for incompatibility is uncertainty 
over when the Boardman balancing test is to be applied. Despite 
superimposing the balancing test, Tan Meng Jee probably intended 
the test to act as a residual discretion. However, cases like Lee 
Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor30 (“Lee Kwang Peng”) and Teo Ai 
Nee suggest that the balancing test completely supersedes ss 14 
and 15 of the Evidence Act – a clear contravention of s 2(2) – 
and also operates as the mandatory admissibility test as opposed 
to a residual discretion. This uncertainty is compounded by the 
persistent lack of clarification as to whether prejudicial effect 
under the Boardman balancing test entails non‑epistemic 
considerations (such as moral prejudice and dignity).31 If it does, 
the gateway of admissibility of similar fact will be narrowed.
26 Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [48].
27 Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [49]–[50].
28 Tan Meng Jee v Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [52].
29 This was clarified in a subsequent House of Lords decision, Director of Public 
Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447.
30 [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569.
31 Cf ss 40–43 of the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 (No 69).
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B. Proving actus reus
21 Actus reus may be disputed if, for instance, the charge is 
flatly denied by the accused, the identity of the alleged perpetrator 
is unconfirmed, or an alibi is pleaded.32 Even though the Evidence 
Act was meant to only allow similar fact to prove mens rea, the 
High Court in Lee Kwang Peng applied s 11(b) of the Evidence Act 
to admit similar fact to prove actus reus.33 Section 11(b) states:
Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant —
…
(b) if by themselves or in connection with other facts 
they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in 
issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.
22 Lee Kwang Peng held that the words “highly probable or 
improbable” in s 11(b) reflect the balancing test in Boardman (and 
also Director of Public Prosecutions v P),34 and could therefore be used 
to admit actus reus evidence.35 In acknowledging that this would 
contradict Stephen’s intention of limiting the similar fact rule 
to ss 14 and 15, the court said that academic texts like Stephen’s 
Digest should not be used to construe Parliament’s intention.36 
Additionally, there was no reason to be shackled by the strict 
codification of Stephen’s statement on the law of evidence.37
23 Lee Kwang Peng has remained unchallenged authority in 
expanding the scope of the similar fact rule to include admission 
of actus reus evidence. However, commentators have argued 
that Stephen’s Digest is not a mere academic text but instead 
constitutes legislative work.38 Indeed, s 122 of the Evidence Act, 
which is one of the provisions that circumscribes the type of 
questions that can be asked in cross-examination, only refers 
32 For alibi, see s 105, illustration (b) of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed), 
as well as s 278 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed).
33 Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [43]–[47]. See also 
Public Prosecutor v Radhakrishna Gnanasegaran [1999] SGHC 107.
34 [1991] 2 AC 447.
35 Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [43].
36 Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [46].
37 Lee Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 SLR(R) 569 at [46].
38 See for instance Michael Hor, “Similar Fact Evidence in Singapore: Probative 
Value, Prejudice and Politics” [1999] Sing JLS 48 at 58.
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to ss 14 and 15 when discussing the similar fact rule. Moreover, 
admitting similar fact to prove actus reus requires the court to 
make an additional inference on top of the one it makes to prove 
mens rea.39 The inferential chain of reasoning is likely to be weak. 
It is therefore unsurprising that Singapore is the only known 
Indian Evidence Act jurisdiction to use s 11(b) like how Lee Kwang 
Peng did.40
C. Recharacterisation of evidence
24 When similar fact could not be admitted under ss 
11(b), 14, or 15, the Court of Appeal in Ng Beng Siang v Public 
Prosecutor (“Ng Beng Siang”) allowed the admission of similar 
fact to provide a “complete account of the facts”,41 otherwise 
known as “background” evidence. In Ng Beng Siang, evidence 
relating to five bundles of drugs found in the accused’s boot 
of his car was admitted “as a matter of completeness”.42 This 
approach of recharacterising evidence that would otherwise have 
engaged an exclusionary rule was later adopted on at least two 
separate occasions.43
25 First, the High Court in Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh 
Gill Menjeet Singh (“Ranjit Singh”) admitted evidence of previous 
drug trafficking transactions under ss 6 and 9 as such evidence 
was held to be cogent and relevant evidence pertinent to the 
accused’s mental state.44 Subsequently, in Micheal Anak Garing 
39 Michael Hor, “Similar Fact Evidence in Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice 
and Politics” [1999] Sing JLS 48 at 59.
40 See Chen Siyuan & Lionel Leo, The Law of Evidence in Singapore (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2018) ch 5.
41 Ng Beng Siang v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGCA 17 at [41]–[42].
42 Ng Beng Siang v Public Prosecutor [2003] SGCA 17 at [42].
43 Comparisons may also be drawn with how evidence involving another 
exclusionary rule, hearsay, has been treated in recent cases. For example, 
in Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 686 (“Gimpex”), the 
Court of Appeal applied s 32 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) when 
hearsay evidence was sought to be admitted. Although the court was not 
categorically tasked to address the question of whether the evidence could be 
recharacterised to escape the clutches of the exclusionary rule (hearsay), the 
fact that the general relevancy provisions could have been used but were not 
implies that much would depend on how material the evidence is. See also 
Teo Wai Cheong v Crédit Industriel et Commercial [2013] 3 SLR 573.
44 [2017] 3 SLR 66 at [19].
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v Public Prosecutor (“Micheal Anak Garing”), the Court of Appeal 
admitted, pursuant to s 6, evidence of three earlier attacks on 
unrelated individuals prior to the fourth attack that resulted in 
a murder, as all the attacks formed part of one transaction.45 
Rejecting the evidence would provide the court with a “truncated 
version of the material events which might not shed true light 
on the attack”.46
26 These decisions suggest that similar fact may be admitted 
under other provisions beyond ss 11(b), 14, and 15; in Ng Beng 
Siang, reference to the Evidence Act was not even needed. While 
one could argue that courts may only recharacterise evidence for 
the purpose of being apprised of the full factual matrix (instead 
of using the evidence to specifically prove actus reus and/or mens 
rea), it appears that Stephen had intended for relevant facts which 
are connected to the facts in issue to be distinct from relevant 
facts which are unrelated to the facts in issue.47 If so, ss 6 and 9 
should not be used to admit facts which are mere “background” 
evidence unrelated to the present offence.
27 A related question that arises is the relationship between 
general and specific relevancy provisions in the context of similar 
fact. As demonstrated in Lee Kwang Peng, Ranjit Singh, and Micheal 
Anak Garing, similar fact may be admitted by fulfilling either 
a general or specific relevancy provision, not both. However, 
according to Stephen, evidence that is excluded by specific 
relevancy provisions cannot be admitted under general relevancy 
provisions on the mere basis that it is probative.48 The general 
relevancy provisions admit facts purely on the basis of probative 
value, while the specific relevancy provisions admit facts on the 
premise that the evidence is best available and reliable. If so, 
existing case law admitting similar fact under general relevancy 
provisions like ss 6, 9, and 11(b) would fall afoul of Stephen’s 
intention when he drafted the Evidence Act, unless it can be 
shown that those cases did not truly involve similar fact evidence.
45 [2017] 1 SLR 748 at [9].
46 Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 748 at [10].
47 James Fitzjames Stephen, Introduction to the Indian Evidence Act (MacMillan 
and Co, 1872) at p 55.
48 James Fitzjames Stephen, Stephen’s Digest (MacMillan and Co, 1911) at p 155.
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D. Judicial discretion to exclude evidence
28 As mentioned earlier, the High Court in Phyllis Tan held 
that s 2(2) of the Evidence Act prevents the use of common law 
rules of evidence that are inconsistent with the Evidence Act.49 
In Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan (“Mas Swan”), the High 
Court affirmed Phyllis Tan, and noted that using the Boardman 
test to exclude similar fact otherwise admissible under the Makin 
categorisation approach would be inconsistent with the Evidence 
Act.50 However, Mas Swan did clarify that Explanation 1 to s 14 
and the phrase “similar occurrence” in s 15 corresponded to the 
Boardman test, and should remain good law.51
29 If Phyllis Tan remains good law, two matters must be 
resolved. First, if the Boardman test is inconsistent in so far as 
it excludes evidence otherwise admissible under the statutory 
provisions, how can this tension be resolved? Second, should 
the Phyllis Tan approach in declaring that there is no residual 
discretion to exclude evidence which is otherwise rendered 
legally relevant under the Evidence Act be adopted?
30 As mentioned earlier, the 2012 amendments to the 
Evidence Act introduced a discretion under ss 32(3) and 47(4) 
for hearsay and opinion evidence, respectively. These provisions 
use the “interests of justice” test. During the Parliamentary 
debates, Minister for Law K Shanmugam noted that this was in 
addition to the court’s inherent jurisdiction to reject prejudicial 
evidence.52 However, the deliberate omission to extend this 
discretion to the similar fact provisions cannot be ignored. Phyllis 
Tan is no anomaly as subsequent cases such as Lee Chez Kee v 
Public Prosecutor have confirmed that courts have no residual 
discretion to exclude evidence deemed legally relevant under the 
Evidence Act.53
49 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 
at [124]–[126].
50 [2011] SGHC 107 at [103]–[107].
51 Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan [2011] SGHC 107 at [107].
52 Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (14 February 2012), vol 88 at cols 45 
and 46 (K Shanmugam, Minister for Law) (Second Reading of the Evidence 
(Amendment) Bill).
53 Lee Chez Kee v Public Prosecutor [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 at [106].
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31 Even if a judicial discretion to exclude similar fact evidence 
exists, conceptual difficulties arise: how should prejudice be 
defined, how should it be balanced against probative value, and 
is the balancing test synonymous with “interests of justice”? 
First, prejudice cannot be conclusively defined – and has not 
been by the Singapore courts. It encapsulates multiple concepts, 
such as the risk of cognitive error, infringing the principle of 
“individualised justice”, and undermining the presumption of 
innocence.54 Prejudice also has different meanings in different 
contexts: for instance, prejudice in similar fact in criminal 
proceedings will differ from hearsay in civil proceedings. Second, 
the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect has 
been observed to be impossible, since the two are not necessarily 
antithetical to each other and may even be positively correlated.55
32 Lastly, the courts have had differing interpretations of 
“interests of justice” under ss 32(3) and 47(4). The Court of 
Appeal in Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd56 has interpreted 
“interests of justice” as requiring factors to be balanced against 
probative value.57 These factors include: danger of unreliability, 
delay in the proceedings, distraction of the court or parties, 
tendency to confuse or misleading effect, and prejudice.58 In 
comparison, the High Court in ANB v ANC59 and Wan Lai Ting v 
Kea Kah Kim60 had previously equated “interests of justice” to the 
balancing test of probative value against prejudicial effect.
33 In sum, if there exists judicial discretion to exclude 
prejudicial evidence, one should be less concerned with the 
54 Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact Evidence” (1998) 19 Sing 
L Rev 166 at 167–169.
55 Michael Hor, “Similar Fact Evidence in Singapore: Probative Value, Prejudice 
and Politics” [1999] Sing JLS 48 at 50; Chen Siyuan, “Revisiting the Similar 
Fact Rule in Singapore: Public Prosecutor v Mas Swan bin Adnan and Another” 
[2011] Sing JLS 553 at 555; Eunice Chua, “Recent Developments Concerning 
Similar Fact Evidence in Singapore – Pushing Boundaries of Admissibility: 
Public Prosecutor v Ranjit Singh Gill Menjeet Singh [2017] 3 SLR 66; Micheal Anak 
Garing v Public Prosecutor [2017] 1 SLR 748” (2018) 30 SAcLJ 367 at para 46.
56 [2015] 2 SLR 686.
57 Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 686 at [105].
58 Gimpex Ltd v Unity Holdings Business Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 686 at [105].
59 [2014] 4 SLR 747 at [31]–[49].
60 [2014] 4 SLR 795 at [18]–[19].
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expanding scope of the similar fact rule to include actus reus 
evidence and “background” evidence, though it remains unclear 
on what basis judges can decide to exclude evidence. Further, the 
2012 amendments may have codified an exclusionary discretion 
that does not extend to similar fact evidence. Regardless, there 
remains an additional safeguard of weight, where judges can 
place little to no weight on evidence revealed to be unreliable.
IV. Conclusion
34 With all of the above considerations in mind, the 
authors thought it would be useful to conclude by comparing 
and contrasting the conceptual extremes of how to facilitate the 
admissibility of similar fact on one end, and how to object to the 
admissibility of similar fact on the other – so this means some of 
the extremes may not necessarily be the best or most plausible 
argument to make. Nonetheless, the table below complements 
the checklist exercise just undergone, and provides a visual of 
how opposing positions may be adopted and justified:
Admit the evidence Object to admissibility
Prove mens rea • Use the general 
relevancy provisions 
as they are wide and 
may not be subject 
to any exclusionary 
discretion (Ranjit 
Singh, Micheal Anak 
Garing)
• Alternatively, apply 
s 14 or s 15 based on 
the interpretation 
by Tan Meng Jee (ie, 
Boardman), focusing 
on sheer probative 
value
• Evidence that 
is caught by an 
exclusionary rule 
must satisfy both a 
general and a specific 
relevancy provision
• Alternatively, insist 
on applying the text/
illustrations of s 14 
or s 15 due to the 
high thresholds of 
specificity and series 
of occurrences; 
point too to Makin 
that prohibits mere 
propensity reasoning
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Admit the evidence Object to admissibility
Prove actus reus • Apply s 11(b) based 
on Lee Kwang 
Peng, as it is a 
general relevancy 
provision and may 






• Using similar fact to 
prove actus reus was 
not contemplated 
by Stephen, and 
recharacterisation of 
evidence should not 
be freely allowed
• Alternatively, s 11(b) 
can only be used to 




the meaning of 
prejudice
• The Evidence 
Act does not 
contemplate any 
such discretion, with 
the exception of 
ss 32(3) and 47(4), 
which are not similar 
fact provisions. 
Weight is a sufficient 
safeguard
• Alternatively, any 
discretion is only 
concerned with 
prejudicial effect 
in the narrow 
sense, which is 
lack of probative 
value (Phyllis Tan). 
The weighing of 
incommensurables 
would be difficult
• An exclusionary 
discretion exists 
(Muhammad bin Kadar 
v Public Prosecutor,61 
ANB v ANC, Gimpex, 
2012 Parliamentary 
debates), whether by 
virtue of the common 
law or inherent power
• Prejudice is not 




considerations such as 
moral prejudice and 
dignity
• Alternatively, consider 
factors discussed in 
Gimpex, and reframe 
the test not as a 
balancing exercise 
but as a judgment 
based on a global 
assessment of factors
61 [2011] 3 SLR 1205.
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Admit the evidence Object to admissibility
Recharacterising 
evidence 
• Use general 
relevancy provisions 
as they are wide and 
may not be subject 
to exclusionary 
discretion
• Alternatively, use 
background evidence 
per Ng Beng Siang
• Recharacterising 
evidence goes against 
the spirit of the 
Evidence Act; some 
recharacterisation 




• Alternatively, both 
general and specific 
relevancy provisions 
should be satisfied
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